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Luther: Stakeholder Versus Stockholder: The Director's Proper Constituenc

STAKEHOLDER VERSUS STOCKHOLDER: THE DIRECTOR'S
PROPER CONSTITUENCY IN A CONTEST FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL
INTRODUCTION

Increasing concern over the effects of takeovers on the economy
and society is evident from the amount of scholarly attention given
to the topic.' This concern is justified in light of the increasing
number of unsolicited tender offers2 which have taken place in re1. See Johnson, Minnesota's Control Share Acquisition Statute and the Need for New
JudicialAnalysisof State Takeover Legislation, 12 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 183, 184-85 n.5
(1986); see also Bebchuk, The Case for FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1028 (1982)[hereinafter Bebchuk I]; Bebchuk, The Casefor Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982)[hereinafter Bebchuk
II]; Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A CriticalAssessment of the Tender
Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984)[hereinafter Coffee
I]; Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1 (1986)[hereinafter Coffee II]; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter
Easterbrook & Fischel I]; Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook Fischel II]; Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook
& Fischel III]; Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1982)[hereinafter Gilson I]; Gilson, The
Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: StructuralLimitations on the Enabling Concept, 34
STAN. L. REV. 775 (1982)[hereinafter Gilson II]; Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus
Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982) [hereinafter Gilson III];
Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Social Responsibility, 21
STAN. L. REV. 248 (1969); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW.
101 (1979)[hereinafter Lipton I]; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Respose to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (1980)[hereinafter
Upton II]; Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (1987)[hereinafter Lipton III]; Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A ProposalforLegislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1983); Oesterle, The Negotiation
Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 117
(1986); Oesterle, Target Managers as NegotiatingAgents for Target Shareholders in Tender
Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53 (1985). See generally Berle,
For Whom CorporateManagers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); Dodd,
For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
2. Although securities regulations have failed to define the term "tender offer"
clearly, courts have considered eight factors in determining the existence of a tender
offer: (1) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for shares of an
issuer; (2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (3) offer
to purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market price; (4) terms of the
offer are firm rather than negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed
maximum number of shares for purchase; (6) offer open for only a limited period of
time; (7) offeree subjected to selling pressure; and (8) public announcements of a
purchasing program concerning the target company preceed or accompany rapid ac-
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cent years.S Corporations which wish to remain independent or
which do not wish to be acquired by a particular offeror have responded to the escalation of takeover activity with novel and innovative plans.4 These defensive measures have an impact on a variety of
interests.5 The representatives of these interests have focused attention on the legal, ethical, and practical questions faced by directors
of corporations in resisting hostile tender offers or in implementing
6
devices to deter future takeover attempts.
A major dilemma confronting management is its identification of
the appropriate constituency to serve in evaluating a tender offer or
in adopting anti-takeover devices.7 In a corporate control contest,
directors are confronted with their traditional fiduciary duty to the
shareholder to maximize the shareholders' wealth. 8 Directors, however, also have a duty to the corporation as a whole and to the persons, or "stakeholders," whose lives are directly affected by the
corporation. These persons include the corporation's employees,
suppliers, creditors, customers, and local communities as well as its
cumulation of a large number of the target's stock. SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale
Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624 (1982); Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
3. See Trevor, Hostile Takeovers-the Corporate Killing Field One Year Later, Statement at National Investor Relations Institute, Spring Conference, Orlando, Florida,
June 8, 1987 at 2-3. "One major company has gone 'into play' each and every week
since March of 1985 in the United States. And we're talking about big firms and
major traditional American names-such as Allied Stores, BankAmerica, Gillette,
Goodyear, Owens-Coming, Phillips Petroleum, Sperry, Unocal and USX." Id.; see
also Pozdena, Who Benefits From Takeovers?, Buvyotrrs & ACQUISITIONS, Mar.-Apr. 1987,
at 10 (acceleration in the prevalence of takeovers as a means to accomplish corporate
combinations has generated concern among analysts about the effects of tender offers on the corporate sector and the stability of the financial system).
4. See Note, Defensive Tactics to Hostile Tender Offers-An Examination of Their Legitimacy and Effectiveness, 11 J. CORP. L. 651 (1986)(comprehensive discussion of the elements of a contest for corporate control including various anti-takeover devices).
5. The concern over takeovers encompasses not only investors' interests but
also the interests of "stakeholders" in corporations, such as employees, suppliers,
creditors, and local communities. The impact tender offers have on corporations and
our society as a whole has been equated with problems such as the national debt and
defense spending. Id. at 652-53. See Sommer, Hostile Tender Offer is Critical Issuefor
Congress, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 21, 1985, at 19.
6. See infra notes 193-215 and accompanying text.
7. See Feinberg, The Directors' New Dilemma in the Takeover Crisis: A Special Report,
INSTITTIONAL INVESTOR,June, 1987, at 30. Directors are faced with competing interests, their primary duty to their shareholders, and their duty to the corporation as a
whole and its future as a business enterprise. Id. at 46.
8. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). "In carrying out
their managerial roles, directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its shareholders." Id. at 872 (citing Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch.
138, 2 A.2d 225 (1938), aff'd, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. Super. Ct. 1939)).
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shareholders .9
The possible deleterious impact of a takeover on these constituencies has caused many scholars to temper their positions as to the desirability of hostile tender offers.1o For many, the focus is no longer
only on the traditional policy of protecting shareholder interests, but
has broadened to include a wider array of interests.lI
Consideration of these "stakeholder" interests by directors in
takeover crises and other management decisions is supported by the
courts, 12 state anti-takeover legislation,'S amendments to various
companies' articles of incorporation,14 and in the American Law
Institute's recommendations on corporate governance.1 5 However,
9. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The
Delaware Supreme Court held that a corporation's directors in evaluating a defensive
measure to a takeover, may properly consider the impact of such a measure "on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees and perhaps even the community generally)." Id. at 955. See also Johnson, supra note 1, at
185.
10. Id. at 184 n.5.
11. Id.
12. E.g., Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d 946.
13. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 5 (1988 & Supp. 1989) which states:
In discharging the duties of the position of director, a director may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of the
corporation's employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the economy
of the state and nation, community and societal considerations, and the
long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders including the possibility that these interests may be best served by
the continued independence of the corporation.
Id. See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (Vernon Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.347 (Vernon Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1710.59 (Anderson 1985 &
Supp. 1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8363 (Supp. 1988).
14. Control Data Corp. implemented such a provision in its corporate charter:
The Board of Directors of the Corporation, when evaluating any offer of
another party to (a) make a tender or exchange offer for any equity security
of the Corporation, (b) merge or consolidate the Corporation with another
corporation, or (c) purchase or otherwise acquire all or substantially all of
the properties and assets of the Corporation, shall, in connection with the
exercise of its judgment in determining what is in the best interests of the
Corporation and its stockholders, give due consideration to all relevant factors, including without limitation the social and economic effects on the employees, customers, suppliers and other constituents of the Corporation and
its subsidiaries and on the communities in which the Corporation and its
subsidiaries operate or are located.
Lipton I, supra note 1, at 110 n.37.

15. See

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-

§ 2.01 (Tent. Draft No. 2 1984). The American Law Institute outlined its recommendations defining the corporate objective as follows:
A business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain,
except that, whether or not corporate profit and shareholder gain are
thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its business
(a) is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the
boundaries set by law,
TIONS
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an expansion of the director's traditional fiduciary duty may be
misfocused when the principal tenets of corporation law are
considered. 16
Subordinating shareholders' interests to other constituencies effectively abandons the long-standing and fundamental principles
upon which management of a business corporation is based-the
corporate directors' duty to maximize financial returns to shareholders.1 7 The inconsistency in the concept of "stakeholder" interests is
that a board of directors, which is accountable to everyone, in reality
is accountable to no one. 18 Consideration of stakeholder interests
by directors making decisions concerning tender offers may seem appropriate in some limited circumstances.1 9 Proper protection of
shareholder interests, however, accomplishes the same result without prostituting the traditional doctrines of corporation law. 2 0
This Note examines the traditional view of the corporate enterprise and contrasts it with the development and influence which the
stakeholder model has exerted on corporate management within the
context of a hostile tender offer. Second, this Note studies the quandary confronting directors torn between conflicting goals-preserving the corporate entity for the benefit of many constituencies by
resisting a takeover attempt, or seeking the highest immediate return
for its shareholders by acquiesing to a hostile bid. Third, this Note
reviews some common strategies used by management to resist hostile tender offers and some of the criticisms of these plans. Finally,
this Note examines the economic utility of takeovers and the propriety of contesting tender offers with defensive strategies and suggests
that constituent interests are most adequately preserved by a policy
(b) may take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably
regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business, and
(c) may devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.
Id. at 25.
16. See Carter, To Whom is a Corporate Directora Fiduciary?,9 NAT. L.J. 21, 22 (July
6, 1987)(discussing corporate directors' liability to shareholders for breach of fiduciary duties).
17. See infra notes 21-215 and accompanying text.
18. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1192. Accountability to the holders of conflicting interests arguably will ultimately harm both groups and "reduc[e]
the willingness of people to entrust their money to [directors]." See also Fiedler, Dayton Hudson's Pyrrhic Victory, CORP. REP. MINN. Sept. 1987, at 59. Provisions in state
anti-takeover statutes have been criticized as diluting the director's traditional duty of
care owed to shareholders. Id. at 64.
19. See Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics. A Comment on Two Models,

96 YALE L.J. 295, 295 n. 1 (1986)(a takeover can redistribute wealth to shareholders
without increasing economic output in cases such as the downward renegotiation of
employee contracts or leveraged acquisitions transferring wealth from bondholders).
20. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1190-92.
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which aggressively and exclusively promotes shareholder wealth but
which adopts a benign approach to tender offers.
I.

TRADITIONAL VIEW

The traditional view2l or pure market theory22 of the corporation

advocates that directors have a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and with its shareholders of a type similar to the relationship
which a trustee has to a trust and with its beneficiaries.23 Courts
have often applied fiduciary obligations to directors of corporations
as "quasi-trustees." 24 Although directors are not trustees in the
pure legal sense, their relationship to the corporation and its stockholders involves responsibilities and obligations similar to that in a
trust relationship. 2 5
A corporation, however, could not conduct business if its directors
were held to the same standard as ordinary fiduciaries, who may not
21. The "traditional model" of the corporate enterprise restricts the discretion
of corporate boards to those acts which maximize the present return on the shareholder's investment. This view is based upon the legal conception of the corporation
as an instrumentality which has as its exclusive purpose the accumulation of wealth
for its owners. The following statement by economist Milton Friedman epitomizes
the traditional view:
A corporate executive's responsibility is to make as much money for the
stockholders as possible, as long as he operates within the rules of the game.
When an executive decided to take action for reasons of social responsibility, he is taking money from someone else-from the stockholders, in the
form of lower dividends; from the employees, in the form of lower wages; or
from the consumer, in the form of higher prices. The responsibility of a
corporate executive is to fulfill the terms of his contract. If he can't do that
in good conscience, then he should quit his job and find another way to do
good. He has the right to promote what he regards as desirable moral
objectives only with his own money. If, on the other hand, the executives of
U.S. Steel undertake to reduce pollution in Gary for the purpose of making
the town attractive to employees and thus lowering labor costs, then they
are doing the stockholders' bidding. And everybody benefits: The stockholders get higher dividends; the customer gets cheaper steel; the workers
get more in return for their labor. That's the beauty of free enterprise.
PLAYBOY MAGAZINE, Feb. 1973, at 59, reprinted in R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS at 52A
(3d ed. 1986).
22. Under the "pure market" model of the corporation, a term often utilized in
economic analysis, profit maximization is attained through the operation of market
forces. See Solomon & Collins, Humanistic Economics: A New Model For the Corporate
Social Responsibility Debate, 12J. CORP. L. 331, 333 nn. 10-14 (1987).
23. See, e.g., Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 27 Del. Ch. 381, 392, 38 A.2d 808,
813 (1944); Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138, 167-68, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (1938), aff'd,
23 Del. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).
24. See, e.g., Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch.
1975)(temporary restraining order issued where proposed stock redemption motivated by managers seeking to maintain control).
25. See Pomeroy v. Simon, 17 NJ. 59, 64, 110 A.2d 19, 22 (1954). The relation is
not one of a trustee in the technical sense because title to corporate property is in the
corporation rather than in the directors. Id.
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have the smallest degree of self-interest in a transaction.26 By the
very nature of his or her position, a corporate director has a certain
amount of self-interest in everything he or she does.2 7 In corporate
transactions, therefore, directors are held to the rule which governs
trustees and prohibits the use of trust property for the trustee's personal gain.28 Although they are collaterally benefited in their posi-

tions, directors have the duty to administer the corporation's
business for the benefit of its stockholders, and to exercise their best
skill and judgement solely in the interests of the corporation. 29
As "quasi-trustees," corporate managers are charged with the duty
to maximize the business' profits in order to enhance the stockholders' return on their investments.3 0 This duty is generally carried out
without considering the potentially adverse impact it has on other
matters unrelated to shareholder returns.3 1 As owners of the corporation,3 2 stockholders traditionally have been entitled to employ
managers dedicated to conducting the business of the corporation
for their benefit alone.3a
The limitation on directors' attention to goals other than profitability is illustrated by Dodge v. FordMotor Co. 3 4 Dodge exemplifies the
director's traditional duty to maximize shareholder wealth.35 In the
26. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 999 (1981).
"The very fact that the director wants to enhance corporate profits is in part
attributable to his desire to keep shareholders satisfied so [he may maintain his seat
on the board]." Id. In situations which otherwise would involve a conflict of interest
for ordinary fiduciaries, the business judgment rule "postulat[es] that if actions are
arguably taken for the benefit of the corporation, then the directors are presumed to
have been exercising their sound business judgment rather than responding to any
personal motivation." Id.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. McKee, 34 Del. Ch. 537, 542-43, 107 A.2d 240, 243
(1954).
29. Id.
30. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1191.
31. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
32. A shareholder is possessed of the legal attributes of ownership of the corporation, including, the right to control, the risk of loss, and the right to retain profits.
When a shareholder does not run the corporation himself, he must employ managers
willing to subordinate their interests to his economic goal in order to maximize his
profits. Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders,Managers, and Corporate Social
Responsibility 21 STAN. L. REV. 248, 250 (1969). But see A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORAIrlON AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). The modem reality of the

centralization of managerial power in a board of directors severely limits a shareholder's opportunity to exercise any type of meaningful control. In most public corporations the board has evolved into a self elected, self perpetuating, and selfinterested group of managers. Id. at 119-25.
33.

See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 32, at 119-25.

34. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
35. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1191.
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1919 action by minority shareholders to compel the Ford Motor
Company to pay dividends,36 Henry Ford and other directors instituted a plan to share the corporation's profits with the public.3 7
Ford's directors chose to substantially reduce the price of the company's automobiles3 8 rather than to pay dividends out of an enormous accumulated surplus.3 9 This price reduction would have
immediately diminished stock value and shareholder returns. 40 In
affirming the lower court's ruling compelling Ford to pay dividends,
the Michigan Supreme Court asserted that Ford's directors were obligated to conduct the business of the corporation exclusively for the
benefit of its shareholders4 1 and that the directors' discretion extended only to choosing the most appropriate means to accomplish
that end.42 The court concluded that permitting the directors to

withhold dividends in order to further altruistic goals would release
corporate directors from their fiduciary duty and allow them to
change the purpose of the business from a device designed to enhance shareholder wealth to one designed to enhance public
welfare.43

In 1939, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Guth v. Loth, Inc. ,44 similarly set out the traditional role of the board of directors and its duty
to protect and enhance the shareholders' financial interest in the corporation.45 Guth illustrates that a director may not subordinate the
interests of the corporation or its shareholders to his or her own interests. 4 6 Guth involved a corporate director who diverted a potentially lucrative business opportunity,47 producing Pepsi-Cola syrup
36. Dodge, 204 Mich. at 474, 170 N.W. at 673.
37. Henry Ford was clearly the prominent force of the Ford Motor Company in
the early 1900s; no plan or operation could have been carried out without his consent. Ford thought that his company had made too much money. Although profits
could have been even greater, Ford sought to share the company's wealth with the
general public. Henry Ford's ambition was to "employ still more men, to spread the
benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build
up their lives and their homes." Id. at 505, 170 N.W. at 683.
38. The plan called for a reduction in the price of a car from $440 to $360. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).
45. Id. at 270, 5 A.2d at 510. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that corporate directors and officers, while technically not trustees, stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its shareholders which demands "peremptorily and
inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty .
Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The rule of corporate opportunity prevents a corporate director from
seizing a business opportunity from the corporation if the corporation is financially
able to undertake it. See, e.g., Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp.,
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for the bottling company, away from the corporation in order to undertake the venture himself.48 In upholding the Chancery Court's
assessment of damages,49 the Delaware Supreme Court reiterated
the long-standing rule commanding a corporate director to protect
the interests of shareholders and to refrain from any activity which
may deprive the corporation of profit.5o
Although the concept of the corporation has changed and the discretion afforded directors has been broadened since Dodge and Guth,
the directors' traditional fiduciary relationship to shareholders has
been maintained in modem corporation law.51 Most states have

codified the common law rules regarding management's fiduciary
obligations.52 Minnesota, for example, outlines a director's standard
of conduct to encompass this duty. Specifically, subdivision 1 of
Minnesota Statutes section 302A.251 provides that "[a] director
shall discharge the duties of the position of director in good faith, in
a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation

....

"5.

While a statutory framework outlining directors' accountability to
the corporation is important, the crucial rules regarding fiduciary
duty have been developed by the courts on a case by case basis.54
Because the issues and facts involved in decisions contemplated by
corporate boards are often very complicated, general legislation
alone offers little guidance for predicting important outcomes or
planning transactions. 5 Case law scrutinizing directors' decisions
has given meaning to abstract codes.5 6
425 A.2d 957, 963 (Del. 1980); Kaplan v. Fenton, 278 A.2d 834, 836 (Del. 1971);
Equity Corp. v. Milton, 43 Del. Ch. 160, 164, 221 A.2d 494, 497 (1966); Miller v.
Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 219-20, 222 N.W.2d 71, 78 (1974).
For a comprehensive discussion of the corporate opportunity doctrine see Note,
When Opportunity Knocks: An Analysis of the Brudney & Clark and ALl Principlesof Corporate
Governance Proposalsfor Deciding CorporateOpportunity Claims, 1IJ. CORP. L. 255 (1986).
48. Guth, at 258-66, 5 A.2d at 505-10.
49. The Chancery Court ordered that all shares of Pepsi-Cola stock held by defendant Guth be transferred to the complainant. Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138,
191, 2 A.2d 225, 248 (1938).
50. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. at 268, 5 A.2d at 510.
51. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273
(2d Cir. 1986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
52. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1983 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT.
§ 302A.251, subd. 1 (1988).
53. MINN. STAT. § 3024.251, subd. 1 (1988).
54. See I R. BALOTrI &J. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS at lxviii (Supp. 1986).
55. Id.
56. See Chittur, The CorporateDirector's Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future, 10
DEL.J. CORP. L. 505, 509 n.25 (1985) (list of case authority interpreting state statutes
setting out the directors' standard of care).
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Among the leading cases lending guidance as to the director's fiduciary responsibility to shareholders is the 1985 decision of Smith v.
Van Gorkom.5 7 The decision in Van Gorkom is important58 because it
establishes the minimum level of care which directors must exercise
before their decisions are protected by the business judgment rule.59
In Van Gorkom, the directors of Trans Union Corporation approved
a nonhostile merger of the corporation into a wholly-owned subsidiary of Marmon Group, Inc.6 0 Shareholders of Trans Union subse-

quently sued, claiming they had received an inadequate price for
61
their stock.
In determining whether the Trans Union directors properly approved the merger, the Delaware Supreme Court did not merely defer to the directors' business judgment.62 Rather, the court
undertook an extensive review of the board's decision-making process. 63 The court concluded that the Trans Union directors
breached their fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by
57. 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
58. For an extensive review of the Van Gorkom decision, see Chittur, supra note
56, at 505-43.
59. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873. See, e.g., Note, Target Threctors' Fiduciary Duties: An Initial Reasonableness Burden, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 722 (1986). For a comprehensive discussion of the elements of the business judgment rule as applied by
Delaware courts in corporate control contests see 1 R. BALOrTI & J. FINKELSTEIN,
supra note 54, at § 4.6.
60. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 863.
61. Id. at 871. The board did not adequately consider what was the "intrinsic"
value of the corporation. Despite the fact that the fifty-five dollar per share price the
shareholders received for their stock was well in excess of the current market price,
there was no way for the board to know without further consideration whether such
price was reasonable. Id. at 877.
62. Id. at 874 (corporate directors are required to avail themselves of all material
information regarding a transaction that is available to them); see also Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984).
63. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874; see, e.g.,
Wander & LeCoque, BoardroomJitters:
CorporateControl Transactions and Today's BusinessJudgment Rule, 42 Bus. LAw. 29, 38-39
(1986). The court focused on a number of factors:
(i) The directors did not take sufficient time to properly study and analyze
the proposed merger and the issues involved-i.e., the directors based their
decision almost entirely upon the president's (Van Gorkom) twenty-minute
oral analysis of the merger transaction, were unaware that Van Gorkom himself had orchestrated the transaction and had suggested the price himself to
the buyer, failed to ask about and were unaware of the terms of the merger
agreement, and approved the merger in the course of one hastily called twohour board meeting;
(ii) The director's failed to obtain any written documentation in support of
the merger price-i.e., no consultation was made of management or any investment advisor as to the "intrinsic value" of the company and no fairness
opinions or valuations were given as to the fairness of the merger, nor did

the board insist on such formal evaluations before making their decisions;
and
(iii) The directors failed to review any of the documents prepared in con-
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failing to marshal adequate information regarding the value of the
corporation's stock before recommending the merger.64 In reaching
its decision, the Van Gorkom court applied a gross negligence standard 6 5 to the conduct of the directors-a standard which has become
66
known as the directors' duty of care.
Although the decision in Van Gorkom has been criticized, 6 7 it does
caution directors to consider the appropriate standard of care when
contemplating complex business transactions. It also serves to remind directors of their traditional duty in representing the financial
interests of the shareholders. 6 8 In Van Gorkom, this duty specifically
involved obtaining the best possible price for the shareholders'
stock.69
Most of the cases currently involving the directors' duty to shareholders arise from disputes concerning management's resistance to
unsolicited tender offers 7O or from management's use of anti-takeover devices that allow directors to resist non-negotiated takeovers
without prior stockholder approval. 7 1 In a contest for corporate
control posed by an unsolicited tender offer, a corporation's board
of directors is charged by its fiduciary duty to exercise due care in
nection with the proposed merger-i.e., the directors were not given, nor
did they request, copies of any of the key merger arguments.
Id.
64. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
65. Id. at 873 (citingAronson, 473 A.2d at 812). But see Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM
Corp., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying a "reasonable diligence"
standard).
66. See generally supra note 58.

67. See Burgman & Cox, Corporate Directors, Corporate Realities And DeliberativeProcess: An Analysis of the Trans Union Case, 11J. CORP. L. 311, 313 (1986)(Smith v. Van

Gorkom is typically referred to as the Trans Union case and has been critized as being
incongruent with corporate reality, and because it raises questions as to the standard
of care owed by directors which would be difficult for judges to resolve).
68. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
69. Id. at 874.
70. See, e.g., Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio 1987),
aff'd, 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987)(tender offeror sought permanent injunction against
employee stock ownership plan and poison pill which were adopted by directors of
target corporation and sought preliminary injunction against other measures
adopted by directors); MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501
A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 505 A.2d 454 (Del. 1985), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986)(acquiror filed action for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent board of
directors of target corporation from issuing note purchase rights to its shareholders);
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)(court upheld directors'
adoption of preferred share purchase rights plan as legitimate exercise of business
judgment); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)(a minority shareholder making a hostile tender offer for company's stock filed a complaint to
challenge decision of board of directors to effect a self-tender offer by corporation
for its own shares).
71. See Note, supra note 4, at 668-69.
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deciding whether to endorse the tender offer or to deploy defensive
measures. 7 2 The 1986 decision of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings Inc. 73 provides an excellent example of directors' traditional

7
duty to protect stockholder investments. 4
In Revlon, the board of directors of Revlon instituted a series of
defensive measures 7 5 to thwart a hostile takeover attempt by Pantry

Pride, Inc. 76 As part of its strategy, Revlon attempted a defensive

repurchase of its own stock, commonly known as a self-tender offer.7 7 The rationale behind Revlon's efforts to reacquire its shares

was essentially to prevent Pantry Pride from obtaining enough Revlon stock to gain control of the corporation. 78 By repurchasing its
own stock, Revlon sought to bolster the market price of its shares in
order to deter Pantry Pride from raising its hostile bid.79

The self-tender attempted by Revlon's board involved the issuance
of debt securities in the form of senior subordinated notes in exchange for shares to be acquired from Revlon stockholders.80 This
transaction changed the status of the stockholders who participated
in the exchange from owners to creditors of the corporation. 8 1 The
noteholders' creditor status is significant because it transformed the
Revlon directors' duty. Although the directors maintained a responsibility to protect the value of the noteholders' investment, under the
72. Id. at 668.
73. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
74. Id. at 176-80.
75. See Note, supra note 4, at 661-67; see also infra notes 171-206 and accompanying text.
76. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176-77. Revlon instituted a "poison pill" in the form of a
Note Purchase Rights Plan and attempted a "self-tender offer" by offering to repurchase its own stock from its shareholders. Revlon also courted a "white knight" in
agreeing to a leveraged buyout by Forstmann & Little Co. and implemented a "lockup" device by granting Forstmann the option to purchase its Profitable Vision Care
and National Health Laboratories divisions. Id. at 176-79.
77. See generally Wander & LeCoque, supra note 63, at 56-58. A self-tender offer
involves an offer by a corporation to purchase its own shares for cash or debt instruments with value in excess of the acquiring entity's bid. The rationale of the selftender is that it allows the shareholder the choice of selling his shares to obtain cash
or notes, or to retain his stock in the belief that ownership of the company will provide greater returns. Id.
78. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177.
79. Id.
80. Id. Under the self-tender offer, Revlon offered to repurchase up to 10 million shares of its own stock, exchanging one senior subordinated note (a corporate
debt security, with a $47.50 principle payable at 11.75 percent along with one-tenth
of a share of $9.00 Cumulative Convertible Exchangeable Preferred Stock) for each
common share reacquired.
81. See generally B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPrrAL 1-15
(1977)(a comprehensive discussion involving the relative rights accruing to equityholder and debtholders).
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traditional view of the corporation, that responsibility was
subordinate to the directors' fiduciary duty to the remaining
shareholders.82

A problem with the transaction arose when the self-tender failed to
deter Pantry Pride from raising the stakes in the contest for control
of Revlon.8 3 Revlon's board, concerned that the company would fall
into unfriendly hands, unanimously agreed to sell the company's
stock to a more desirable suitor and consented to a leveraged buyout by Forstmann and Little Co.84
Under the terms of the buy-out, Forstmann Little was to assume
Revlon's liability for the $475 million debt incurred by the issuance
of notes in Revlon's attempted self-tender.8 5 To reach such an
agreement with Forstmann, however, Revlon waived certain covenants8 6 of the note indenture which protected the interests of the

debt holders.
When Revlon announced the terms of its merger with Forstmann
Little, specifically the waiver of the note covenants, the value of the
notes immediately began to fall.87 When the value of the notes fell,

the Revlon board was deluged by calls threatening litigation. 8 8
During Revlon's negotiations with Forstmann Little, Pantry Pride
persisted in its efforts to acquire the corporation.8 9 Pantry Pride
stated that it would engage in fractional bidding for Revlon's stock
and threatened to top any Forstmann Little offer.90 Fearful that Pantry Pride would complete its hostile acquisition and confronted with
seemingly impending litigation over its issuance of debt, the Revlon
92
board agreed to a lock-up 9 ' arrangement with Forstmann.
Under the arrangement, Forstmann Little agreed to support the
value of Revlon's notes in the market in exchange for a lock-up op82. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1190-92.
83. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177.
84. Id. at 178.
85. Id.
86. Id. The notes contained covenants which limited Revlon's ability to incur
additional debt, sell assets, or pay dividends unless otherwise approved by the independent (non-management) board members.
87. Id. The notes which originally traded near par, around $100, dropped to
$87.50 approximately one month after they were issued.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. A "lock-up" or "crown jewel" defensive tactic occurs when a target corporation grants a company which is a more desirable suitor, commonly known as a "white
knight," the option of purchasing highly valued assets of the corporation. This tactic
is designed to make the target corporation a less attractive target in the eyes of the
hostile acquirer and is usually triggered by a contingency such as a hostile bidder's
acquisition of a set percentage of the target's stock.
92. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
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tion on two of Revlon's most profitable divisions.93 The lock-up
granted Forstmann Little the option to purchase Revlon's Vision
Care and National Health Laboratories divisions at a fraction of their
market value94 in the event another bidder acquired forty percent of
Revlon's shares.95
The lock-up arrangement effectively ended an intense bidding
contest for Revlon without requiring Forstmann Little to significantly increase its bid for the corporation.96 Pantry Pride challenged
the arrangement seeking to enjoin the transfer of the lock-up assets
to Forstmann Little.97
The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Chancery Court's
holding that Revlon directors had breached their duty of loyalty by
making concessions to Forstmann out of concern for the noteholders. 98 Rather than maximizing the sale price of the corporation, the

Revlon board instead sought to protect the interests of the corporation's creditors. 99 The court held that the Revlon board inappropriately allowed their fundamental duty of maximizing shareholder
profits to be subordinated to the interests of other stakeholders in
the corporation. 1oo
While recognizing the importance of various constituencies' interests in a takeover situation, loI the court would not allow those inter2
ests to transcend the directors' obligation to the shareholders.10
Revlon stands as a significant statement of the directors' traditional
duty to maximize shareholder investment once the breakup of the
93. Id.
94. Id. Revlon granted Forstmann the option to purchase its Vision Care and
National Health Laboratories divisions for $525 million, $100-175 million below the
value ascribed to them by Lazard Freres, Revlon's investment banker.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 184.
97. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1248
(Del. Ch. 1985).
98. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185.
99. Id. at 184.
100. Id. at 185.
101. Specifically, the court stated:
The Revlon board argued that it acted in good faith in protecting the noteholders because Unocal permits consideration of other corporate constituencies. Although such considerations may be permissible, there are
fundamental limitations on that prerogative. A board may have regard for
various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are
rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.
Id. at 182.
102. Id. at 184. The Revlon court held that concern for noninvestor interests is
inappropriate when a bidding contest for the corporation is taking place. When such
an action is in progress, the object of the directors should no longer be to maintain
the corporate enterprise, but to sell it to the highest bidder. Id.
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corporation becomes inevitable.103
Revlon, however, does not completely resolve the dilemma with
which directors are faced when a takeover bid has been made. O4
The decision provides guidance into the directors' responsibility to
the shareholders only once a takeover becomes imminent.105 Prior
to that point, directors must serve competing constituencies. They
must either maintain the corporate enterprise for the benefit of its
06
stakeholders and the speculative future gain of its shareholders,1
or effectively undertake an auction to obtain the greatest immediate
07
return for the corporations' stock.t
II. STAKEHOLDER VIEW
The traditional view of the corporation is based upon the economic perspective of the corporate entity as an aggregation of shareholder interests for the purpose of accumulating wealth.10 8 The
stakeholder theory, on the other hand, exhorts much broader social
objectives.10 9 The stakeholder model views shareholders as merely
one constituency of the corporation.10 The theory postulates that
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. The court's rationale seems to
imply that the directors may preserve the corporate enterprise even in the face of a
tender offer which may be profitable to the shareholders. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
105. The Revlon court stated:
The duty of the board .. .changed from the preservation of Revlon as a

corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the
stockholders' benefit. This significantly altered the board's responsibilities
under the Unocal standards. It no longer faced threats to corporate policy
and effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly inadequate bid. The whole question of defensive measures became moot. The
directors' role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company.
Id.; see also Lipton III, supra note 1, at 41 (Revlon should not restrict the capacity of a
target's board to act for broader constituencies when the target is not yet for sale).
106. See Newton, Charting Shark-Infested Waters: Ethical Dimensions of the Hostile Take-

over, 7J. Bus. ETHICS 81, 83 (1988).
107. Id.
108. For a discussion of the traditional view of the corporation, see supra notes
21-22 and accompanying text.
109. Cf. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1265
(1982); Mashaw, Corporate Social Responsibility: Comments on the Legal and Economic Context
of a ContinuingDebate, 3 YALE L. & POL'v REV. 114, 115 (1984); Stone, Corporate Social
Responsibility: What it Might Mean if it Were Really to Matter, 71 IowA L. REV. 557 (1986).

Historically, the role of the corporation in society has been the cause of much controversy. Disagreement over the corporate entity's function results from the economic,
social, and political powers which a corporation may exercise. The stakeholder theory emerges from contentions that the corporation and its management have a "social responsibility" or duty to serve communal interests in addition to the interests of
its stockholders.
110. Stone, supra note 109.
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employees, consumers, suppliers, and the general public are sufficiently affected by a corporation's activities to merit consideration in
decisions which impact their interests."'I
The stakeholder model is based in part upon the concession theory"12 or pure political modellls of the corporate enterprise. This
view, which broadens the constituency of corporate managers, provides that the government may condition corporate status on an organization's practice of activity which meets the criteria of social
utility' 4 and public responsibility., 5 The concession theorist believes that because an entity is permitted by the state to possess corporate status, it is required to protect the interests of the persons
affected by the corporation, perhaps even to the detriment of its
shareholders' interests. 16 Under this view, in addition to stockholders, a corporate manager's constituency is made up of employees,
7
suppliers, and the general public."l
This concept of increased corporate responsibility is not new."t 8
America's earliest corporations were established to effect social
111. See Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145,
1149 (1932). In 1932 Professor E. Merrick Dodd initiated the controversy over
which constituencies' corporate managers validly represent in conducting the business of the corporation. Amidst the social trepidation of the Great Depression, Dodd
argued that corporate boards must effectively act as trustees for a wide variety of
constituencies in addition to shareholders. With the recent acceleration in takeover
activity and concern for various interests which are impacted by the phenomenon,
attention is once again drawn to the issue examined by Dodd over five decades ago.
Lipton III, supra note 1, at 33.
112. The concession theory essentially demands a quidpro quo from the corporation in the form of socially beneficial activity in exchange for citizens' grant, through
government, of the special privileged and powers inherent in the corporate form. See
Dahl, Governing the Giant Corporation in CORPORATE POWER INAMERICA 11 (R. Nader &
M. Green eds. 1973).
113. The "pure political" theory views the corporate entity as an institution exercising power over individuals who have no control over its activities. The model
considers social responsibility to be the furtherance of social objectives which will
benefit the groups affected by the corporation-its employees, suppliers, the local
community and society in general. See Solomon & Collins, supra note 22, at 336 nn.
35-39.
114. Under the concession theory a corporation must provide public services or
undertake activity which is beneficial to society as a whole. For example, it is argued
that corporations further the social interest of economic growth by providing an instrumentality for the aggregation of capital. See id. at 339; see also Fischel, supra note
109, at 1269.
115. Id. Conversely, corporations must refrain from activities which are detrimental to the public interest and must be accountable for such activities. See Solomon &
Collins, supra note 22, at 332 n.2.
116. See id. at 341.
117. Id.
118. See Seavoy, The Public Service Origins of the America Business Corporation, 52 Bus.
HIST. REV. 30, 31 (1978).
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objectives."9 At the end of the eighteenth and during the early
nineteenth century, corporations originated to undertake such activities as constructing roads and bridges to enhance transportation, establishing banks and savings institutions to provide a reliable source
of credit and currency, and organizing manufacturing concerns to
free the American economy of its dependency on European industries.120 However, as general incorporation laws121 replaced the
special charter during the late nineteenth century,1 22 the corporation
23
lost its intimate connection with public objectives.1
The concept of the corporate enterprise as a device to maximize
shareholder wealth replaced notions of the corporation as an instrument to achieve public good.' 24 Aspirations for social welfare were
no longer congruent with the profit motives of companies' shareholders. 125 In this era, many American financial empires were built
26
on self-interest.'
By the beginning of the 1980s, however, due largely to an escalating demand for corporate responsibility, the view of the corporation
as a social instrumentality127 had come almost full circle.128 Concern for social welfare has had an enormous impact on corporate
governance. 129 Like the public utilitarianism of America's earliest
corporations,lSO the operation of modern corporate entities reflects
119. SeeJ. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, 17 (1970).
120. See Seavoy, supra note 118, at 30.
121. See Werner, Corporation Law in Search of itsFuture, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611,

1620-27 (1981)(author decribes both the Berle view and the Brandis view concerning the effect of general incorporation law on legislative control over corporations.
Berle was concerned that the general incorporation laws destroyed state regulation
while Brandis thought that general incorporation laws, in their late nineteenth century form, were a high point in state control over corporations).
122. Id. at 1615-20 (author also compares Berle's and Brandis's view on the effect
of the special charter and outlines their agruments concerning the impact of legislative power over the granting of special charters in early American history).
123. See generally J. HURST, supra note 119, at 46.
124. Id. at 70-71.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See generally Epstein, Societal, Managerial,and Legal Perspectives on CorporateSocial
Responsibility--Productand Process, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1287 (1979).

128. Id.at 1310.
129. See Schwartz, Objective and Conduct of the Corporation:Defining the CorporateObjective: Section 2.01 of the ALI's Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511, 524-27 (1984); see
generally Eisenberg, An Introduction to the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance
Project, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495, 495-98 (1984).
130. See Epstein, supra note 127, at 1310. The public service character of the corporation arises out of the delegation of fundamental economic functions to the cor-

porate enterprise by the American economy. Id.
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an expanded social responsibility.' 3 , The deeply-felt need of the
American public to limit a corporation's power and to render it socially accountable has significantly affected the management of contemporary corporations.13 2
In the past decade, the explosion133 of takeover activity has deepened concerns over the effect of mergers on society.' 3 4 Interest
groups which are affected by averse business combinations have become increasingly active.'35 Takeovers, particularly hostile takeovers, have been criticized as detrimental to societal interests.
Critics allege that takeovers impinge research and development and
thus impair productivity, cause plant closings and thus result in lost
jobs, and displace corporate assets resulting in the loss of valuable
tax revenues. '

36

Many commentators, mindful of the possible pernicious effects of
131. See Stone, supra note 109, at 217.
132. See Epstein, supra note 127, at 1310.
133. See supra note 3.
134. See Nussbaum & Dobrzynski, The Battlefor Corporate Control, Bus. WK., May 18,
1987, at 102; Williams, It's Timefor a Takeover Moratorium, FORTUNE, July 22, 1985, at

133-34.
135. See Lipton III, supra note 1, at 43-46 (a critique of takeover regulations encompassing the rights of various interest groups).
Corporate boards confronted with hostile tender offers have gone to great
lengths to obtain public support for their decision rejecting hostile bids, often hiring
public relations firms to help them wage their battle. In response to an unsolicited
tender offer by Britain's Grand Metropolitan PLC, Pillsbury ran a full page ad in a
Minneapolis newspaper depicting the Pillsbury Doughboy sporting boxing gloves
and containing the following caption:
Our Board recognized that Pillsbury has the potential to grow and prosper
and to generate substantial returns to our shareholders. We understand
that the Pillsbury family of employees is the most critical factor in our future
growth and we intend to see that their interests are protected. In response
to our duty to all of our constituencies, we have put the gloves on the Pillsbury Doughboy. And we're taking other steps necessary to protect our employees, our communities, and the trust the consumer has placed in us for
so many years.
Minneapolis Star Tribune, Oct. 19, 1988, at 7D.
136. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 488, 1984 Minn. Laws 470. The Minnesota
Legislature, in a prelude to enacting Section 80B.01-13 of Minnesota Statutes, found
the following concerning the detrimental impact of tender offers:
Takeovers particularly, hostile takeovers,
(1) exaggerate the tendency of many businesses to focus on
short-term performance to the detriment of such long-term societal interests as increased research and development, improved productivity,
and the modernization of physical plant and employee capabilities;
(2) are often inconsistent with the economic interests of shareholders;
(3) in many instances threaten the jobs and careers of Minnesota
citizens and undermine the ethical foundations of companies, as when
jobs are eliminated and career commitments to employees are breached
or ignored;
(4) often result in plant closings or consolidations that damage
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takeovers, have argued that directors of target companies have a responsibility to consider interests of noninvestor groups when confronted by a tender offer.137 Proponents of this view advocate that
the scope of discretion afforded to directors in the context of ordinary business decisions under the business judgment rule should be
expanded to encompass decisions of boards in corporate control
contests.' 3 8 Employing such expanded discretion, directors would
be able to implement defensive strategies to validly protect employees, suppliers, customers, and the communities in which the corpora39
tion operates. 1

Recently, the acceleration of takeover activity has subjected decisions made by corporate boards to heightened attention. Courts
have begun to re-evaluate their function in reviewing board decisions which impact the corporation's ownership structure. 40 Because takeover decisions have a more immediate effect on
shareholder wealth than do operating decisions and of the inherent
implication of board self-interest in takeover decisions, courts have
applied a modified interpretation of the business judgment rule to
14 1
assure that the interests of shareholders are taken into account.
communities dependent on the jobs and taxes provided by these plants;
(5) not infrequently wipe out long standing customer/supplier relationships and the stability and continuity which these relationships
provide throughout society;
(6) frequently tie up billions of dollars of scarce capital that could
be more effectively applied;
(7) all too often stifle, and ultimately destroy, the entrepreneurial,
innovative spirit of creative individuals in independent firms; and
(8) are usually conducted in an atmosphere and pursuant to laws
that do not provide a reasonable opportunity for affected parties to
make informed decisions.
Id.
137. See, e.g., Lipton I, supra note 1, at 119-20 (arguing that directors should be
cognizant of issues of national policy and should not sacrifice the interests of stakeholders when the question is solely whether or not shareholders may have an opportunity to immediately realize profit on the sale of their shares); see also Steinbrink,
Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. REs. 882, 889-90 (1978).
138. See Lipton I, supra note 1, at 120. Lipton argues that the decisions confronting a director arising from a takeover bid are not distinct from other fundamental business decisions. He urges that corporate boards are frequently faced with
decisions which may have as significant an impact on the corporation as a hostile
tender offer. But see Wander & LeCoque, supra note 63, at 42 (authors see corporate
operating decisions and corporate control decisions as distinctly different types of
decisions that should not be compared).
139. See Lipton I, supra note 1, at 110.
140. See Wander & LeCoque, supra note 63, at 42 (the impact of corporate control
decisions may be such that they determine whether or not the existing group of
shareholders will continue to exist).
141. Recognizing that shareholders may not be adequately represented by a potentially self-interested board of directors, courts have assumed the role of protectors
of shareholder rights. See, e.g., infra notes 147-48.
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In applying the rule, courts have recognized that takeover decisions
possess a prominent business character. Therefore, the impact a
tender offer has upon non-investor interests is listed among the criteria directors may consider when deciding whether to embrace a
hostile bidder or to adopt measures to ward off a perceived threat. 142
Increasingly, the business judgment rule has been used in the context of the hostile tender offer to shield management from attack and
liability for implementing defensive measures to resist takeovers.143
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. ,144 exemplifies such use of the rule.
The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the use of a self-tender offer
implemented by the Unocal directors to resist an unsolicited tender
offer by Mesa Petroleum.145 More importantly, however, the court
142. However, the principles upon which the business judgment rule is founded,
care, loyalty and independence, must first be satisfied. See Revlon, Inc., v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986).
143. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-94 (7th Cir.
1981) (rule presumes business judgment was expressed, plaintiff must show by inference that impermissible motive predominated the decision-making); Crouse-Hinds
Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980)(court must respect directors' decisions unless there is evidence of fraud or bad faith); Cheff v. Mathes, 199
A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964)(directors will not be penalized for honest mistakes injudgment, if the judgment appeared reasonable at the time of the decision); Bennett v.
Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 411 (Del. 1962)(a lack of prior knowledge and an emergency
combined to create an exception to the general rule that directors who use corporate
funds to preserve control commit a wrong).
144. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
145. Id. at 949-53. A minority shareholder making a hostile offer for the Unocal
corporation's stock filed a complaint to challenge the decision of the Unocal board of
directors to effect a self-tender offer by the corporation for its own shares. The hostile tender offer entailed a two-tier "front loaded" cash tender offer for 64 million
shares or approximately 37% of Unocal's outstanding stock at a price of $54 per
share. The "back-end" was designed to eliminate the remaining publicly held shares
by an exchange of securities with a purported worth of $54 per share but which Unocal aptly termed "junk bonds." The self-tender offer provided that if the minority
shareholder acquired 64 million shares of Unocal stock through its hostile offer,
Unocal would buy the remaining 49% outstanding shares for an exchange of debt
securities having an aggregate par value of $72 per share. The Supreme Court of
Delaware held that the board of directors, having acted in good faith and after reasonable investigation, found that the two-tier "front loaded" cash tender offer was
both inadequate and coercive, and that the board was vested with the power and duty
to oppose the proposed tender offer and to effect a self-tender by the corporation for
its own shares. Id.
Similarily, the district court in Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp.
829 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987) upheld
the use of a "poison pill" defensive strategy by the Gelco board of directors. The
"poison pill" essentially involved a "rights plan" whereby the holder of each right
(excluding the acquiring entity) could purchase $126 worth of Gelco stock for $63 in
the event of a hostile takeover. In examining the action of the Gelco board in implementing the rights plan and other defensive strategies, the court held the board had
to show reasonable grounds for believing the takeover posed a threat to the corpora-
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resolved that the business judgment rule would be extended to apply
to all board decisions addressing a takeover bid.146 Although the
Unocal court applied the business judgment rule to the directors' decision, it placed an initial burden on Unocal.14 7 This burden required the board of directors to show they had reasonable grounds
to believe that Mesa's ownership of Unocal stock posed a danger to
Unocal's policy and effectiveness.148
Unocal is significant to the stakeholder model because it provides
broad criteria for directors to evaluate a tender offer.149 The Delaware Supreme Court stated:
If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business
judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat
posed. This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the
takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples
of such concerns may include: . . . the impact on "constituencies"

other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and
perhaps even the community generally) .... 150
Unocal illustrates that the business judgment rule may be used to
broaden the scope of the directors' traditional fiduciary duty.151 Ap-

plication of the business judgment rule in this context allows stakeholder interests to be furthered, possibly at the expense of
shareholder interests.152
In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,153 the Delaware Supreme
Court took the Unocal modified business judgment rule analysis one

step further.154 The determination legitimized a corporate board's
tion's policy and effectiveness and that the defensive measures employed were reasonable in relation to the threat shown. Id. at 845.
146. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. The Unocal court concluded that corporate boards
should be no less entitled to the respect they would otherwise be accorded in the
realm of business judgment. "Because of an omni-present specter that a board may
be acting primarily in its own interests .... there is an enhanced duty which calls for
judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment
rule may be conferred." Id.
147. Id. at 955. The threshold examination imposed by the Delaware Supreme
Court placed the burden on target directors to establish: (1) that they had reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy existed; and (2) that the defensive measure adopted by the board was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
Id.
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 146-47.
150. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
151. Analysis of the takeover bid includes examination of the adequacy of the
price offered, the nature and timing of the offer, the risk of nonconsummation of the
combination, and the quality of the securities offered in the exchange. Id.
152. See Wander & LeCoque, supra note 63, at 34-38 (interests may be considered
only if there are rationally related benefits for the shareholders).
153. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
154. Id. at 1351. The Delaware Supreme Court extended the analysis set out in
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decision to implement strategies designed to counteract prospective
takeover attempts.1 55 The board of directors of Household International, Inc. adopted a shareholder rights plan.156 This poison pill
was motivated by the directors' fear that the corporation may have
been vulnerable to a future averse acquisition.t5 7
After concluding that the Household board had the statutory
power to adopt the Rights Plan, the court examined the directors'
fiduciary duty in undertaking the strategy.158 The Moran court allowed the board to assert the business judgment rule because the
directors had met the initial burden set out in Unocal.I5 9 The court
concluded that the Household directors had reasonable grounds for
believing the corporation was vulnerable to a takeover that could
damage the company.Go The court held that the Rights Plan was a
reasonable defense mechanism to protect the corporation and that
implementation of the plan was within the valid business judgment
of the Household directors.161
The Delaware Supreme Court decision in Moran validates prospective anti-takeover strategies. However, Moran's greater significance
to the stakeholder model lies in the Delaware Chancery Court's analUnocal to a situation in which the board took actions designed to defeat a hostile
takeover bid even though no actual tender offer had been made. Id.
155. Id. (without affirmative evidence of legislative intent to limit the applicability
of the relevant statute, the court declined to impose such a solution).
156. Under the right's plan each shareholder was to receive one right for each
share of the corporation owned. The right would become exercisable upon the occurrence of either of two triggering events; first, if anyone acquired twenty percent or
more of the corporation common stock; or secondly, if anyone publicly announced a
tender offer to purchase at least thirty percent of Household's common shares. The
effect of the rights plan was to give shareholders different options before and immediately after an acquiring entity consummated a business combination with Household, Inc.
Once either of the triggering events occurred, each right entitled a shareholder
to purchase a share of preferred stock for $10,000. If the shareholder did not exercise the right prior to a merger, the right would "flip over" on the acquiring entity,
entitling the shareholder to purchase $200 of the company's common stock for $100.
In essence the plan was designed to dilute a hostile acquirer's capital structure and
increase any potential financing of a hostile takeover significantly. Id. at 1348-49.
157. Id. at 1349. The Household directors were concerned with the increased
prevalence of "bust-up" and "two-tiered" tender offers which it perceived as a danger to the corporation, its stockholders, and its employees. Id.; see also Note, Protecting
Shareholders Against Partialand Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred,97 HARV.

L. REV. 1964, 1967 (1984)(shareholder rights plans discourage both partial and twotiered takeover bids).
158. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357. The court concluded that the Delaware General
Corporation Law §§ 141, 151 & 157 (8 Del. Laws 141, 151, 157 (1983)) empowered
the board to adopt the rights plan.
159. See supra note 147.
160. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357.
161. Id.
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ysis of the case. 1 62 The Chancery Court's analysis demonstrates the
influence of the stakeholder model on judicial determinations, by the
court's willingness to allow directors to justify their actions according to the interests of one or more corporate constituencies.16 3 The
Chancery Court was influenced by the Unocal court's expansive definition of the corporate enterprise which included creditors, customers, employees, and the community generally.16 4 Regarding antitakeover strategies, the court stated "[s]uch actions by a target
board, if taken to protect all corporate constituencies and not simply
to retain control, have been consistently approved under the business judgment rule." 165

Notwithstanding the absence of consideration of this issue in the
Delaware Supreme Court's analysis,166 and the subsequent clarification of the scope of the directors' concern in the Revlon decision,1 6 7
the Chancery Court's statement in Moran 168 reflects a judicial tendency to expand the discretion of corporate directors and to
broaden the scope of their accountability to encompass a corporation's stakeholders.
A recent upheaval in takeover legislation has further complicated
the fiduciary quandry confronting directors. This notable change
evolved as a result of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.169 In
CTS, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Act.170 The CTS decision
162. Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1079 (Del. Ch. 1985).
163. Id.
164. Comment, Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 72 VA. L. REV. 851, 868-69 (1986); see
supra note 150 and accompanying text.
165. Moran, 490 A.2d at 1079.
166. In affirming the Chancery court's decision, the Delaware Supreme Court did
not consider its dictum regarding consideration of "all corporate constituencies." See
Moran, 500 A.2d 1346. See also Comment, supra note 164, at 869 ("it is possible that
the Unocal court's reference to 'other constituencies' was merely an incautious dictum
unintended to effect a change in duty owed to shareholders by directors").
167. See Comment, supra note 164, at 869 n.120.
168. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
169. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
170. IND. CODE § 23-1-42 (Supp. 1986).

The Indiana Act applies to any issuing public corporation incorporated in Indiana unless the corporation amends its articles of incorporation to opt out of the Act.
An issuing public corporation is defined as a corporation that has:
(1) one hundred (100) or more shareholders;
(2) its principle place of business, its principle office, or substantial assets
in Indiana; and
(3) either:
(A) more than ten percent (10%) of its shareholders resident in
Indiana;
(B) more than ten percent (10%) of its shares owned by Indiana residents; or
(C) ten thousand (10,000) shareholders resident in Indiana.
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has cleared the way for states to enact legislation which previously
and almost exclusively had been the province of the federal government'71 and the Williams Act.172 The significance of CTS to directors is illustrated by the numerous state anti-takeover laws enacted in
the months following the CTS decision.17 3
Id. at § 23-1-42-4.
Rights are vested in these shares to the extent that the shareholders of the issuing public corporation approve a resolution. Id. at § 23-1-42-9(a).
Thus the pre-existing disinterested shareholders of a corporation dictate
whether the acquiring entity will gain voting rights to the acquired shares. This is
accomplished at the next scheduled meeting of the shareholders or at a specially
scheduled meeting called by the acquiring management. Id.
An acquiring entity can require the management of a corporation to hold a "special meeting" within fifty days if it files an acquiring person statement, requests the
meeting, and pays the expenses of the meeting. If the shareholders do not vote to
permit the vesting of voting power in the shares, the target corporation may, at its
option, redeem the control shares from the acquiring entity at the fair market value.
Id. at § 23-1-42-7.
171. The traditional instrument for protecting shareholders faced with a tender
offer has been the Williams Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e) & 78n(d)-(f)(1982 & Supp.
1987). The act regulates tender offers by requiring dissemination of information and
by promoting investor free choice. The intent of such a regulatory scheme is to place
opposing parties in a takeover contest on a level playing field. State statutes which
conflict with this policy of neutrality have been struck down as violative of the
supremacy clause. Under the pre-emption doctrine, a state law will be held unconstitutional if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See, e.g., Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639 (1982).
The United States Supreme Court held, however, that the Indiana Act was consistent with the provisions and purposes of the Williams Act. The Court concluded
that the Indiana Act protects independent shareholders from the coercive aspect of
tender offers by allowing them to vote as a group, thereby furthering the purposes of
the Williams Act by placing investors on equal grounds with the hostile bidders.
CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1639.
The Court has also examined the Indiana Act to assure that it did not adversely
affect interstate commerce by subjecting tender offers to inconsistent regulations.
Edgar, 457 U.S. at 640-44. The commerce clause empowers Congress to regulate
commerce among the several states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
In CTS, however, the Court held that the Indiana Act reflected a state's valid
concern in promoting stable relationships among the parties involved with Indiana
corporations and thus did not violate the commerce clause. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at
1650-51.
172. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 99 13(d3), 14(d-f), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m (d,e), 78n(d-f) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
173. See Bandow, Are Hostile Takeovers Good for the Economy?, 63 Bus. Soc. REV. 45

(1987). For a listing of the numerous state anti-takeover statutes and a comprehensive discussion of their variations, see Veasey, Finkelstein & Shaughnessy, The Delaware Takeover Law: Some Issues, Strategies and Comparisons, 43 Bus. LAw 865, 876-80

(1988). Notwithstanding minor differences, state anti-takeover laws essentially fall
into four categories: (1) control share acquisition statutes which require shareholder
approval of acquisition of shares surpassing a specific threshold within a specified
period of time; (2) supermajority statutes requiring that an acquisition of shares be
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Such anti-takeover laws have had an exacerbating effect on the dilemma confronting directors. This effect is due primarily to the increased influence the statutes exert on corporate boards to consider
non-investor interests when contemplating takeover decisions. 174
The pervasive effect of the stakeholder theory in the anti-takeover
statutes is clearly visible.17 5
First, the interests of non-investor constituencies are directly promoted by provisions in such statutes calling for managers to consider
employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors in situations where
control of the corporation is likely to change.1 76 The statutes acknowledge that the interests of these stakeholders may be best
served by the company's continual independence. 177
Second, the stakeholder model's effect on the vexatious issue facing directors is indirectly enhanced by the anti-takeover law.' 78 Such
statutes greatly increase the likelihood of proxy contests' 79 and thus,
arguably increase litigation and decrease the likelihood of the
takeover. 180
The capacity which anti-takeover laws have to pre-empt takeovers,
however, remains to be seen.181 Several commentators have argued
that Indiana-type statutes may in fact make it easier for raiders to
capture target corporations. 82 Others argue that the extended period for the tender under many of the statutes will prompt proxy
approved by a specified supermajority of the company's shareholders; (3) cash-out
statutes which require a purchaser acquiring a specified number of a corporation's
shares to give prompt notice to the remaining shareholders and upon demand, pay a
cash amount equal to the value of the shares on the day prior to the day in which
threshold is reached; and (4) five-year freeze out statutes which prohibit an investor
who acquires a specified percentage of shares from engaging in certain business combinations with the corporation for a five year period. Id.
174. See supra note 13.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Bartlett, Beware of State Takeover Laws, FORrUNE, Nov. 9, 1987, at 182.
179. Section 23-1-42-7(b) of the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Act extends to
fifty days the period in which a potential acquiring entity may require target management to call a special shareholder meeting. This adds thirty days to the twenty day
period allowed for a shareholder vote under section 44e-1 of the Williams Act.
180. See Bartlett, supra note 178, at 179. Bartlett argues that a board's ability to
pick up votes in proxy fights by virtue of their management status may frustrate a
takeover that may be obviously beneficial to shareholders.
181. Id.
182. Id. Martin Lipton and others have argued that legislation similar to the Indiana control share statute could assist an acquiring entity by making it easier to put a
company into play. Lipton argues that because directors are required to call a shareholders meeting upon demand of the holders of a substantial share of the company
arbitragers theoretically can buy large amounts of the potential target's stock and as
"disinterested shareholders" vote to grant the raider voting privileges.
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contests which in turn will increase litigation and frustrate hostile
83
acquisitions. 1

While the future effect of anti-takeover legislation is uncertain, the
lawmakers' motivation in enacting such statutes is clear.18 4 Fearful
of raiders' tendency to dismantle companies and to close plants and
lay off workers, state legislators are attempting to protect home town
businesses.1 8 5 States, unions, and local communities have a view of
the corporation distinct from the customary legal conception of the
business enterprise.186 The states see corporations as customers,
suppliers, employees, and tax dollars. Unions see jobs. Local com7
munities see charitable contributions and civic sponsorship.18
Often, however, anti-takeover statutes are not enacted at the resolve of such corporate constituencies, but rather through such constituencies at the behest of large corporations lobbying to entrench
control in their current localities. 188 In the face of impending tender
offers, powerful corporate hierarchies have been able to play on the
insecurity of legislators189 to frustrate tender offers, seemingly without regard to the financial interests of their shareholders.190 Local
legislators, influenced by employee groups and sensitive to the potential loss of tax revenue, have become accomplices to directors'
self-interested abandonment of the traditional duty owed to their
shareholders. 91

The dilemma posed to directors is an ethical as well as legal question. Though directors may validly and legally consider the interests
of non-investor groups in takeover situations, 19 2 they must also care183. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
184. Id.
185. Id.

186. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
187. See Bartlett, supra note 178, at 182; see also Law, A Corporationis More than its
Stock, 64 HARV. Bus. REV. 80 (1986).

188. See Bandow, supra note 173, at 45. In the face of a hostile takeover by Dart
Drug, Dayton Hudson applied political pressure to push the Minnesota Control
Share Acquisition Act through. Dayton Hudson hired five different lobbying firms,
organized an employee letter writing campaign, and mobilized charities it had supported to lobby for the act. Id.; see also Fielder, supra note 18, at 59.
189. As "hometown" businesses have become targets of takeovers, such as Dayton
Hudson (Minnesota), Gillette (Massachusetts), Greyhound (Arizona), Boeing (Washington), G. Heileman Brewing (Wisconsin), Harcort Brace Jovanovich (Florida), and
Burlington Industries (North Carolina), they have prompted their legislatures to enact anti-takeover legislation. Bandow, supra note 173, at 45.
190. Id. It is argued that legislation promoted by the corporate establishment is
motivated more by the hierarchy's interest in protecting their positions on the board
than by their desire to protect shareholder interests.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.241 subd. 6 (1988); see also Buckhorn, Inc. v.

Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 7
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

fully examine the ethical questions which arise. Directors must ascertain for whom they are acting when responding to a hostile tender
offer-their stockholders, their stakeholders, or themselves.
III.

THE DIRECTOR'S DILEMMA

Proponents of the stakeholder view argue that it is not only appropriate for directors of a target company to consider interests of noninvestor groups, but that it is also their duty.19 3 These proponents
would allow shareholder interests to be subordinated to those of
other constituencies in situations where a takeover would adversely
affect the stakeholders. 19 4 This would hold true even if the tender
offer constituted an opportunity for shareholders to profit. 195
Authority supporting consideration of employees, customers, and
suppliers in the decision-making process' 9 6 grants little guidance as
to how these interests should be considered by directors who also
owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders. 9 7 Little attention has been
given to the question as to whether corporations can pursue a policy
of furthering stakeholder interests in a manner consistent with their
traditional charge of maximizing shareholders' investments.198
Although it is increasingly recognized that many groups have a
strong interest in the activities of corporations ' 9 9 and much pressure
is being exerted on management to recognize these interests, 2 00 the
courts, for the most part, have adhered to the traditional view.201
Most contemporary cases have refused to require directors to con202
sider interests apart from the shareholders.
Notwithstanding a handful of recent decisions exhorting the protection of stakeholder interests, 20 3 the Delaware Supreme Court in
Revlon has attempted to make it clear that the directors' primary duty
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.

1985).
193. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1190 n.81.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 850 (D. Minn.
1986); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
197. See Block & Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in
Takeover Contests, 11 SEC. REG. L. J. 44, 69 (1983).
198. Id.
199. See Johnson, supra note 1, at nn. 5-8.
200. See Block & Miller, supra note 197, at 68.
201. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1191 n.86.
202. See, e.g., Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631
F.2d 1264, 1282 (6th Cir. 1980)("community interests" in continued operation of
steel plants could not prevent the company's directors from closing the plants due to
unprofitability). But see Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F. Supp. 1129, 1147 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
203. See supra note 196.
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continues to be the protection of shareholder interests.204
That duty is triggered only once it becomes inevitable that a
tender offer will be successful.205 Until a takeover becomes imminent, an expansive definition of the corporate enterprise to include
creditors, customers, employees, and the community generally,
would seem to continue as long as the directors can show that the
defensive strategies which they are deploying also benefit the company's stockholders.206 These recent Delaware judicial determinations and various states' anti-takeover legislation result in current
uncertainty surrounding the priority and scope of concern for noninvestor constituencies of the corporation. 2 0 7 This uncertainty intensifies the dilemma confronting directors who must remain accountable to the corporation.208
When the interests of equityholders are the directors' exclusive
concern, boundaries exist for assessing the permissibility of board
actions. 20 9 Without this reference point, the restrictions on the conduct of directors are largely extinguished. If a board is allowed to
justify its decisions by acknowledging the various interests of one or
more constituencies, its duty is diffused.2i0 A manager who is simultaneously responsible to interests which oppose one another cannot
possibly be accountable to either.211
Without the traditional precepts establishing the paramount priority of shareholder interests, directors are granted an almost unlimited degree of discretion.212 Within the performance of their
business judgment, directors are allowed to implement defensive
strategies to maintain a corporation's independence in favor of its
stakeholders. Such strategies are allowed to stand as long as the corporation's continued existence arguably, albeit collaterally, benefits
its shareholders. 2 13 Presumably this would hold true even where a
tender offer may be highly profitable for the shareholders.
Whether or not one believes that takeovers serve a beneficial or
204. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (consideration for other constituencies is not appropriate where an auction for the corporation is effectively in progress); see also GAF
Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
205. See supra note 105.

206. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
207. See Lipton III, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that the Revlon decision made the
scope of consideration of non-investor constituencies less certain).
208. See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 30.
209. Cf. Comment, supra note 164, at 869.
210. Id.
211. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1192 (suggesting that directors'
divided interest will ultimately harm society by reducing the trust people have for
corporate directors).
212. See Comment, supra note 164, at 870.
213. See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
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inimical purpose, 2 14 and whether one endorses the stakeholder
model over the traditional view, the current application of the business judgment rule creates an ethical uncertainty for directors.215
Within their discretion, directors may validly choose from a multitude of strategies and devices to resist or to accept a hostile tender
offer. In exercising their judgment in a corporate control transaction, directors must favor the constituency to whom they commit
their responsibility. However, to sustain the interests of one is effectively to forsake the interests of the other.

IV.

ANTI-TAKEOVER MEASURES

Consistent with the discretion allowed them under the business
judgment rule, directors may use their good faith business judgment
to resist an unsolicited tender offer.216 Under this premise they are
empowered to implement a wide variety of defensive measures to
thwart an undesirable takeover bid.217

A.

Repurchase of Stock From Hostile Bidder

A defensive measure often used against takeovers is the repurchase, by a target corporation, of its own shares from a potential hostile bidder who has accumulated a significant amount of the
corporation's stock and who is perceived as a danger to the corporation's independence.218 This practice, commonly known as the payment of "greenmail," usually involves acquiring the shares by paying
a premium over the market price.219

Analysts have criticized such stock repurchases, arguing that
greenmail is unfair to stockholders because it amounts to a involuntary redistribution of corporate assets. 220 Shareholders are deprived
of the chance to vote on the disbursement of corporate funds which
otherwise would be available for distribution in the form of dividends.221 Another reason greenmail is unfair to shareholders is because it distributes corporate funds unevenly, discriminating unfairly
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See supra text accompanying note 192.
Wander & LeCoque, supra note 63, at 41-44.
Block & Miller, supra note 197, at 52-53.
Id.
See Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management-Entrenchment
Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1045 n.3 (1985)(greenmail has been defined as "a
targeted repurchase of securities at a premium price from an investor who holds
more than 3% of the corporation's stock and has held the stock for less than two
years"). See generally Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 19.
219. See Note, supra note 218, at 1046.
220. Id.
221. See Kesner & Dalton, Anti-Takeover Tactics: Management 42, Shareholders 0, Bus.
HORIZONS, Sept.-Oct. 1985, 17, 20.
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in favor of the potentially hostile shareholder who holds a large
2
block of the shares.22

B.

The Poison Pill

A second type of anti-takeover measure is commonly referred to as
a "shareholder rights plan" by those who favor the tactic and as a
"poison pill" by those who do not. 2 23 This device is probably the

most innovative and possibly most popular tactic recently used to
thwart takeovers. 224 In this type of defensive tactic, a hostile tender
offer triggers previously positioned articles of incorporation or bylaws which require the corporation to grant the shareholders a stock
issuance option.2 25 The stock issuance option, known as a "flip-in"

provision, grants the target's stockholders the right to purchase the
corporation's shares at a very low price.2 26 This practice operates to

dilute the hostile bidder's stock and frustrates its ability to accomplish the takeover. 227 A similar type of stipulation, known as a "flipover" provision, grants rights to purchase the raider's shares to the
shareholders.
The chief criticism of the poison pill, as with most defensive tactics, is that it deprives shareholders of the opportunity to take advantage of the premium stock prices which are usually offered by the
bidder in a hostile takeover attempt. 2 28 Another criticism of the tactic is that it may be used by inefficient management to protect their
positions. Both of these criticisms are supported by the traditional
22
view of enhancing shareholder welfare. 9
C. Golden Parachute
Another anti-takeover tactic, the "golden parachute," 2 30 involves
222. Id.
223. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 311 n.45.
224. See Chittur, Wall Street's Teddybear." The "Poison Pill" as a Takeover Defense, 11 J.
CORP. L. 25, 25-26 (1985).
225. Note, supra note 4, at 662-63.
226. See id. at 36.
227. Id.
228. See Wander & LeCoque, supra note 63, at 46. Poison pills evade the shareholder approval process generally required for major changes in the corporation's
structure. These devices arguably represent an attack on shareholder democracy. id.
229. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
230. See Comment, Golden Parachutes:Ripcords or Rip Offs?, 20J. MARSHALL L. REV.
237 (1986). The "golden parachute" vividly creates the image of the corporate executive bailing out of the corporate airplane which is under hostile assault, pulling the
ripcord of his corporate issued parachute and landing safely in a heap of corporate
money outside enemy lines. Id. Golden parachutes are executive employment contracts that provide for various forms of post-employment contracts and compensation for corporate executives who lose their positions upon a change in corporate
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contractual provisions which guarantee top executives cash settlements if their corporations are purchased in a takeover. 2 3 ' The rationale is that hostile bidders will be deterred if they are forced to
pay existing management millions of dollars.232
Proponents argue that "golden parachutes" protect shareholders'
interests by allowing directors, when evaluating takeovers, to make
decisions predicated solely on the tender offer's merits, without concern for their own self interests.23S Critics, on the other hand, maintain that directors, when faced with such a lucrative opportunity
cannot exercise independent judgment regarding takeovers.234
Other opponents argue that directors should not need incentive to
exercise their fiduciary duties. 23 5
D. Lock-up Agreements
Another anti-takeover tactic, the "lock up,"23 6 also referred to as
control. Id. at 38. See also Profusek, Executive Employment Contracts in the Takeover Context, 6 CORP. L. REV. 99, 105-07 (1983); Riger, On Golden Parachutes-Ripcord or Ripoffs? Some Comments on Special TerminationAgreements, 3 PACE L. REV. 15 (1982); Herzel,
Golden ParachuteConracts: Analysis, Nat'l L. J., Feb. 25, 1983, at 20.
231. In Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 232 (S.D. Ohio 1987) a
modified business judgment rule was applied by the U.S. Court of Appeals to determine the reasonableness of the board's decision to enact an "at-will acceleration"
golden parachute for Buckhorn's CEO. The Buckhorn board amended the CEO's
employment contract to include: (1) an extension of the term of employment for an
additional six years; (2) an acceleration of the pension right upon a change in control;
and (3) a severance pay clause which entitled him, upon a change of control, to receive the present value of his future salary due under the terms of the contract. Id. at
216.
The court, relying on Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954
(Del. 1985), weighed the reasonableness of the defensive measure in relation to the
threat posed. It found that the significant cost of the CEO's at-will acceleration of
pension benefits in light of the potential need for the CEO's continued services in
conjunction with the directors' failure to demonstrate the insufficiency of the prior
pension protection raised the specter of unreasonableness in the board's actions as
being self-serving rather than for the benefit of the corporation and its shareholders.
Buckhorn, 656 F. Supp. at 226.
232. See Kesner & Dalton, supra note 221, at 21. "Many golden parachutes, for
example, do not just cover one or two top executives. United Technologies covers
some 64 managers; Kimberly Clark protects 80 executives; and Beneficial's agreements include an astonishing 234 'key' executives." Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See Lewin, Business and the Law using Golden Parachutes, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30,
1982, at D2, col. 1.
236. See Comment, "Leg-ups" and "Lock-ups'" An Analysis of Manipulation Under Section 14(e) of the Williams Act, 49 ALB. L. REV. 478, 479 (1985).
In a lock-up situation, the management of a target company grants to a
white knight an option to purchase an amount of stock sufficient to enable
the white knight to gain control of the target company. A lock-up prevents
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the "crown jewel" defense,237 occurs when a target corporation's
board grants a preferred suitor 238 the option to purchase key corporate assets or a large block of newly-issued stock.239 This option may
benefit shareholders by inducing a reluctant but friendly corporation
to enter a bidding contest. 24 0 By placing the target's most valuable
assets in "friendly" hands24i beyond the reach of unwanted bidders,
"friendly" corporations are given a competitive advantage in a bid2
ding contest. 24
The criticisms of "lockups" highlight a director's dilemma in trying to serve competing constituencies.243 The primary criticism is
that "lockups" impinge upon the natural forces of the marketplace244 by chilling bidding contests that potentionally enhance
2
shareholder investments. 45
Lockups also may allow directors to entrench themselves in their
positions246 may be detrimental to shareholders' interests,24 7 and
may favor stakeholder interests. For example, in Revlon, the shareholders' interests were adversely affected when a "lockup" was
granted in exchange for the preferred bidder's agreement to support
the investment of Revlon's noteholders.248 Because there was no
concomitant increase in the bidder's offer,249 the strategy was viewed
the hostile tender offeror from gaining control of the target company and
thereby forestalls the process of competitive bidding among tender offerors.
Id.
237. A contract to sell valuable assets to a friendly acquirer is known as a "crown
jewel." Distinct from a lock-up device, it usually refers to the sale of hard assets
rather than stock. Id. at 489.
238. See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
239. See Comment, supra note 236, at 489-90. Although commonly referred to as
"lock-ups," "crown jewel" devices are more accurately described as "leg-ups" in that
they do not preclude competitive bidding but merely give one bidder a distinct advantage and thereby deter further bidding. Id.
240. See Note, Lock-up Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1068,

1077 (1983)(discussion of the potential benefits of "reasonably structured" lock-up
devices).
241. See Wander & LeCoque, supra note 63, at 51.
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 375-76 (6th Cir.
1981)(lock-ups held manipulative under Section 14(e) of the Williams Act because
they created an artificial ceiling for the price of stock which circumvented the national
forces of the market). But see Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985)(fully
disclosed lock-ups were held not manipulative).
245. See Wander & LeCoque, supra note 63, at 52.
246. See Note, supra note 240, at 1077 (discussion of the potential benefits of"reasonably structured" lock-up devices).
247. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
178 (Del. 1986).
248. Id.
249. Forstmann did not increase its price per share bid for Revlon but rather
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as an attempt to subrogate shareholder interests in order to confer
benefits on other constituencies.250
E.

The White Knight

A last gasp tactic frequently used by directors to fend off unsolicited takeover attempts involves employing a "white knight" to acquire the company, frequently at a higher price or on more favorable
terms than the undesirable offer.251 This is not, however, a prevalent method of defense. Due to the difficulty in finding an acceptable
merger partner in a limited amount of time, directors have usually
employed other defensive measures to forestall the tender offer until
a desirable suitor can be found.252

Although white knights sound like they may be protectors of corporations, this is not always the case. 253 Because white knights fre-

quently pay a higher price per share than their hostile counterparts,
they may become financially unstable as a result of the transaction.254 While stockholders of the acquired firm may benefit from
receiving a higher price for their shares if they choose to cash out of
their investment, other constituencies may suffer due to the takeover. 2 55 Critics argue that the change in management following a

"friendly" takeover with a white knight may result in more lost jobs
than if the hostile merger had been consummated.256
V.

ANALYSIS

The defensive measures described above illustrate but a few of the
numerous and innovative techniques devised by management to resist hostile takeovers.257 These tactics show that operation of the
business judgment rule will shield directors from liability in implementing defensive measures provided they reasonably believe there
is a valid business reason for resisting an unsolicited tender offer.258
agreed to replace the notes previously issued by Revlon with newly issued securities.

Id.
250. Id. at 179.
251. See Block & Miller, supra note 197, at 52.
252. Id. at 53.

253. See Kesner & Dalton, supra note 221, at 23.
254. Id.
255. Id.

256. Id.
257. See Note, supra note 4, at 661-66.
258. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1018 (1983)(lock-up); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.
1980)(white knight); Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio
1987)(golden parachute); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D.
Minn. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987)(poison pill);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)(self-tender).
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It has been argued that defensive measures motivated by the desire to serve stakeholder interests or the directors' own self interests2 59 are often harmful and contrary to the traditional goal of
maximizing shareholder wealth. 260 However, the propriety of defensive tactics and the precise impact of the tender offer phenomenon
continues to be the subject of fervent debate among takeover scholars. 26 ' Essentially, two divergent views have emerged.

Professors Easterbrook and Fischel,262 Bebchuk,263 Gilson,264 and
Jarrel 26 5 contend that takeovers serve beneficial purposes and have
argued for restraints against the use of anti-takeover measures by
corporate boards. Although these commentators differ as to the degree of usefulness of such measures in certain circumstances,266 for
the most part, they advocate a position of minimal interference with
259. One view is that the most common motivation for implementing anti-takeover strategies is the directors' desire to maintain control of "their" companies. See
Kesner & Dalton, supra note 221, at 18.
260. See Jarrell, Inside the SEC's Panel on Takeovers, 8 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 28,
28-33 (1983). According to an SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, of approximately 100 cases examined in which management utilized defensive measures
to defeat a hostile takeover attempt, the defensive strategies almost without exception resulted in large losses by the target corporation's shareholders. Id.
261. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel II, supra note 1, at 8-9.
At present, the evidence as to the overall impact of unsolicited offers is unclear.
Most of the research cited by proponents of takeover activity centers on stock price
studies. These studies only examine stock prices over a short period of time and
typically do not cover the period after completion of a merger. These studies thus
fail to examine the long-term effects of takeovers on stock prices, and also fail to
measure other important economic factors such as profitability. Id.
Furthermore, there is substantial disagreement as to whether stock prices accurately reflect economic value. The studies also fail to distinguish between hostile and
friendly mergers. They cannot measure the effects, if any, that the threat of takeovers
has on corporate management, nor do these studies conclusively measure the costs
of takeovers. For example, the leveraging of corporate America has come along in
part because of the takeover threat. Is this good or bad or neutral? Id. In sum, the
evidence as to the benefits and costs of takeovers is, at best, debatable and inconclusive. Id.
262. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1; Easterbrook & Fischel II, supra note
1; Easterbrook and Fischel III, supra note 1.
263. See Bebchuk I, supra note 1; Bebchuk II, supra note 1.
264. Gilson I, supra note 1; Gilson II, supra note 1; Gilson III, supra note 1.
265. Jarrell, supra note 260, at 28.
266. See supra notes 262-64. There exist fundamental differences in the views of
Easterbrook and Fischel on the one hand and those of Bebchuk and Gilson on the
other. Easterbrook and Fischel suggest total passivity on behalf of target directors,
allowing shareholders to make decisions impacting the control of the corporation.
Bebchuk and Gilson agree that tender offers are beneficial, but recognize also that
some tender offers are inadequate and should be rejected. They argue that an auction situation may enhance shareholder wealth. Bebchuk and Gilson propose that in
some cases the target directors may be faced by their fiduciary duty to thwart the
takeover attempt. In such an event, the extreme position held by Easterbrook and
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market forces. In their perspective, social and economic values encourage a nearly unrestrained market for corporate control.267
In contrast, Professor Lowenstein 2 68 and Martin Lipton 269 have
argued that corporate managers ought to be able to resist hostile
takeovers. Lowenstein advocates a more limited resistance designed
to reduce shareholder coercion in tender offer situations.2 70 Alternatively, Lipton supports the view that the normal discretion afforded directors in other areas of corporate law should be extended
to include their responses to takeover bids.271 Lipton has urged that
the consideration of stakeholders' interests in corporate control contests should be within the scope of discretion accorded directors
under the business judgment rule. 2 72

In the final analysis, whether the current application of the business judgment rule, as a means of regulating the responses of directors to hostile takeovers, is adequate to balance the interests of those
who may be affected, depends on one's view of who the board of
director's constituency should be.27 3 Although this statement con-

veys the realities of the business judgment rule and recognizes the
position of a growing number of advocates of the stakeholder model,
it fails to consider that the goals of shareholders and stakeholders
are not necessarily adverse.274
In 1981, Easterbrook and Fischel recognized a contiguity in the
interests of shareholders and stakeholders and advanced what has
become known as the passivity theory of tender offers.275 Under this
view, managers are compelled to maximize shareholder wealth and
Fischel would contradict the directors' obligations. Comment, Greenmail: From
Backrooms to Boardrooms to Courtrooms, 23 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 273, 296 (1987).
267. See Bebchuk II, supra note 1, at 24.
268. See Lowenstein, supra note 1.
269. But see Easterbrook & Fischel III, supra note 1, at 8. Easterbrook and Fischel
maintain that because investors hold diversified portfolios of stock, they will be on
both sides of tender offer auctions, holding stock in both acquirer and the target.
They postulate that investors who cannot gain from an auction only stand to lose
from the transactional costs involved. Id. See also Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 300
n.208 (institutional investors own 35% of the outstanding shares traded on the New
York Stock Exchange); Lipton I, supra note 1.
270. See Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 322-33.
271. See Lipton I, supra note 1, at 118-20.
272. Id.
273. See Block & Miller, supra note 197. The authors point out that there is little
guidance for directors given the impossible task of balancing the competing interests
of a multitude of stakeholders. Under the business judgment rule the directors may
favor any interest, even their own, under the guise of what is in the "corporation's"
best interest. Id. at 69-72.
274. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1191 (urging that social welfare is
enhanced if shareholder wealth is maximized).
275. See id. at 1161-64.
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are not allowed to resist takeovers by the use of defensive tactics.276
Easterbrook and Fischel have argued that takeovers, by enhancing
economic efficiency, usually improve the position of all who deal with
the corporation.277 They argue that directors, by adequately protecting the interests of shareholders, assure that the positions of the
groups affected by the corporation's operation are protected as

well. 2 7 8

The premise for this position is based on the efficient capital market theory.279 Under this model, corporations that are run efficiently
will experience a weakened financial position.280 The model suggests that financially weak corporations assume a greater risk of becoming the subject of unsolicited tender offers.281

Although the

passivity theory has been criticized,282 it relates most closely to the
traditional model of shareholder wealth maximization in the free
market system.
Essentially under the market efficiency view, managers of corporations who adopt anti-takeover measures are given undue and artificial market power.2 83 They have the ability to employ defensive
strategies without proper accountability to their shareholders. 2 84
Because inefficiently run corporations become the subjects of takeovers and because directors are allowed to escape adverse mergers
through the employment of anti-takeover defenses, management's
276. Id.
277. Id. But see Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 295 n.l. The Authors
point out that shareholder wealth maximization is not necessarily social wealth maximization. For example, the shutdown of an acquired firm's headquarters produces
efficiency which benefits the shareholders, but at the expense of laid-off employees.
Id.

278. The Authors argue that shareholder wealth maximization is a useful proxy
for social wealth maximization. A transaction which does not meet the criteria to
adequately protect shareholder interests certainly will not adequately protect constituent interests. Id.
279. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, The Marketfor Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1, 5 (1978)(expounding on the con-

cept of the "Market for Corporate Control" proposed by Henry Manne). But see
Burgman & Cox, CorporateDirectors, CorporateRealities and DeliberativeProcess:An Analysis

of the Trans Union Case, I1 J. CORP. L. 311,354-59 (1986)(criticizing the efficient market theory).
280. See Fischel, supra note 279, at 5.
281.

Id. at 5-7. But see Bunbaum, Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory and Legal

Doctrine, 45 Ono ST. L.J. 515, 520 (1984)(to the extent that takeovers are motivated
by factors other than inefficiency, the market system will not identify inefficiently
managed firms as takeovers targets).
282. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
283. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L.
REV. 549 (1984).
284. See Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 653, 680 (1984).
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incentive to run a more efficient business is removed.2 8 5 Managers
do not have the looming anxiety of losing their seats on the board as
the result of a takeover; therefore, their motivation to run their corporation more profitably is decreased.2 86
According to Easterbrook and Fischel, takeovers promote efficiency by either replacing inefficient and incompetent directors or by
motivating incumbent directors to run the corporation more efficiently.287 The argument that in an efficient market system stakeholder interests are protected by the directors' traditional fiduciary
duty is premised on the directors' self-interest in maintaining their
positions.288

If directors adhere to their traditional fundamental task of shareholder wealth maximization, they must run an efficient corporation
to do So.289 The enhanced wealth of the shareholders inures to the
benefit of the various constituencies of the corporation.290 The benefits conveyed upon the stakeholder of a healthy corporation are
most assuredly greater than those delivered by an inefficient corporation utilizing an anti-takeover strategy to maintain the status
quo.

29 1

Notwithstanding its reliance on fundamental economic principles,
the passivity theory has been extensively criticized.292 Opponents of
the passivity theory point out that neoclassical conceptions do not
always bear fruit in reality.293 The passivity theory of tender offers
has been criticized primarily due to the fact that profitable corporations as well as unprofitable corporations often become the subjects
of hostile acquisitions.294 Empirical evidence has recently revealed
that potential acquirer's searches for possible targets have not so
often focused upon inefficiently operated firms, but rather upon
firms in the industrial segment in which the acquirer operates.2 95
It makes perfect economic sense that greater compatibility may be
realized if the acquirer and the target share similar markets, have
overlapping product lines, and possess related technical orienta285. Id. at 678-79.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See Coffee I, supra note 1.
289. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1190.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., Coffee I, supra note 1, at 1200-21; Lipton II, supra note 1, at
1233-36; Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 257-309.
293. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 268.
294. See supra note 292.

295. See Coffee I, supra note 1, at 1206-21; see also Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1988, at 3,
col. 1 (the current acquisition boom is principally being fueled by cash-rich corporations seeking targets in the same or allied industries).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss2/7

36

Luther: Stakeholder Versus Stockholder: The Director's Proper Constituenc
STAKEHOLDER VERSUS STOCKHOLDER

1989]

tions. 296 The industry-specific character of the current takeover
movement, however, does not reduce the veracity of the passivity
theory. It simply changes the frame of reference in which the model
must be analyzed.
Within an industrial segment, a potential acquiring corporation
will seek to capture the best possible bargain among companies with
similar business orientations. 29 7 The most inefficiently operated corporation within such segment will be the company most likely to be
available at a discount. 298 Though profitable, the industry laggard
will be the most vulnerable to a hostile takeover. Under Easterbrook
and Fischel's concept of market efficiency, the laggard corporation
must increase its profitability to escape the takeover. Thus, their
market efficiency theory holds true but in a smaller universe.
CONCLUSION

Allowing directors to consider stakeholder interests in takeover
situations increases inefficiency by granting them undue market
power.2 99 The diseconomy created by the consideration on non-investor interests results in a misallocation of resources which ultimately will weaken the positions of stockholders and stakeholders
0
alike. 30
Under the business judgment rule, as it is currently applied, corporate directors will continue to take steps to defeat tender offers
which may be desirable and profitable for the corporation's shareholders. Given the heightened social concerns that the escalation in
takeover activity has spawned, it becomes more and more likely that
directors will justify resistance of such tender offers out of their consideration for employees, suppliers, creditors, or local communities.
Directors may cite ill-begotten state takeover statutes or cases espousing an expanded corporate constituency as controlling authority. However, such considerations are misplaced if the stakeholders
of all corporations are better served by a rule requiring a benign approach by management to tender offers.
Protection of the interests of those persons detrimentally impacted
by the current tender offer phenomenon is an ambitious and even
admirable goal. "But, it is one thing to say the law must allow for
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See
Id.
Id.
See
See

Coffee I, supra note 1, at 1213-14 nn.206-07.
at 1214-15.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 283, at 555.
Lipton I, supra note 1, at 110. "The scramble by each of these constituen-

cies to protect against sale or liquidation would cause major disruptions in the manner in which business is now conducted. These disruptions would favor the shortterm at the expense of long-term planning that is essential in a high technology economy." Id.
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such developments. It is quite another to grant uncontrolled power
to corporate managers in the hope that they will produce that
development.' 301
Marc C. Luther
301. Berle, supra note 1, at 1372. The words of Professor Berle in resporise to
Dodd's proposal for the advancement of stakeholder interests are no less true today
than they were when they were first written 57 years ago.
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